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AMPUTATING THE LONG ARM OF THE LAW: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION IN MORRISON AND WHY § 10(B)  
STILL REACHES ISSUERS OF ADRS 
PAUL B. MASLO

 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank has substantially shortened the reach of the anti-fraud 
provisions of the securities laws.
1
 Before Morrison, the courts utilized the 
conduct and effects tests to determine whether § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 applied. Under those tests, the statute reached 
fraudulent conduct that occurred in the U.S. and fraudulent conduct abroad 
that had a substantial effect in the U.S. In Morrison, however, the 
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that 
regardless of where the fraudulent conduct occurs or whether the conduct 
has an effect in the U.S., the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act 
apply only to transactions in securities that trade on a U.S. exchange or 
that are purchased in the U.S.  
This Commentary reviews the conduct and effects tests and the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Morrison. It then addresses the new 
transactional rule‘s impact on the application of the Exchange Act‘s anti-
fraud provisions in several situations where courts before Morrison 
routinely allowed § 10(b) claims to proceed: (1) foreign-cubed actions 
(i.e., claims involving a foreign citizen‘s purchase of a foreign issuer‘s 
ordinary shares on a foreign exchange) where the fraud impacts U.S. 
investors or is executed in the U.S.; (2) cases involving a U.S. citizen‘s 
purchase of a foreign issuer‘s ordinary shares outside the U.S.; and (3) 
actions concerning the purchase of a foreign issuer‘s American Depository 
Receipts (―ADRs‖). While courts are in agreement that the test articulated 
in Morrison prevents § 10(b) from reaching defendants in the first and 
second types of actions, they are in conflict as to whether ADR purchasers 
should be able to bring a claim. This Commentary argues that a recent 
 
 
  Paul Maslo is an Associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP. Mr. Maslo earned his A.B. at 
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where he also studied finance at the Wharton School of Business.  
 1. Morrison v. Nat‘l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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district court decision wrongly decided the application of Morrison in the 
ADR context and that the new rule should not prevent most ADR 
purchasers from bringing a cause of action under § 10(b). 
I. CONDUCT AND EFFECTS TESTS 
Before Morrison, courts looked at two factors to determine whether 
they possessed subject matter jurisdiction
2
 over a § 10(b) claim: (1) 
whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the U.S. (the conduct test), or 
(2) whether the wrongful conduct, even if it occurred in a foreign country, 
had a substantial adverse effect on U.S. investors (the effects test).
3
 Even 
though a plaintiff needed only to satisfy either the conduct or the effects 
test to support a finding of subject matter jurisdiction, there was no 
requirement that the two tests be applied separately and distinctly from 
each other, and courts often found that ―an admixture or combination of 
the two . . . gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United 
States involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American 
court.‖4   
The courts focused ―on the nature of conduct within the United States 
as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent scheme‖ to determine 
whether subject matter jurisdiction existed under the conduct test.
5
 The 
circuits were divided as to precisely what conduct was necessary to satisfy 
the test:  
The more restrictive position, generally that the domestic conduct 
must have been of ―material importance‖ or ―significant‖ to the 
fraud and have ―directly caused‖ the alleged loss [wa]s followed in 
the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits. In contrast, the 
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits generally require[d] some lesser 
quantum of conduct.
6
  
 
 
 2. As discussed below, the Court‘s decision in Morrison made clear that whether a § 10(b) 
cause of action exists is a merits question. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876–77.  
 3. See, e.g., In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., No. Civ.A.00-11589-PBS, 2004 WL 1490435 
(D. Mass. June 28, 2004); Tabor v. Bodisen Biotech, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); 
Blechner v. Daimler-Benz AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Del. 2006); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & 
ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D. Md. 2004); Zurich Capital Mkts. Inc. v. Coglianese, 332 F. 
Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Crosbie v. Endeavors Techs., Inc., No. SA Civ. 08-1345 AHS (SSx), 
2009 WL 3464135 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009); SEC v. Wolfson, No. 2:03CV914 DAK, 2003 WL 
23356418 (D. Utah Dec. 10, 2003); Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000).  
 4. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 5. Id. at 123.  
 6. Wolfson, 2003 WL 23356418, at *15. 
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Under the effects test, subject matter jurisdiction existed when 
fraudulent acts committed abroad resulted ―in injury to purchasers or 
sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an interest, not 
where acts simply have an adverse affect on the American economy or 
American investors generally.‖7 It conferred jurisdiction ―where the harm 
inflicted on the foreign plaintiff actually causes harm to U.S. investors or 
markets because of the relationship between the foreign plaintiff and U.S. 
investors.‖8  
The fact-intensive nature of the analysis under each of these tests 
compelled the courts to exercise a great deal of discretion in determining 
whether § 10(b) applied, which resulted in judicial inconsistencies and 
created an atmosphere of uncertainty.
9
  
II. MORRISON 
Morrison‘s journey to the U.S. Supreme Court began in the Southern 
District of New York.
10
 Plaintiffs alleged that National Australia Bank 
(―NAB‖), Australia‘s largest bank, made false and misleading statements 
regarding HomeSide, its Florida-based mortgage servicing unit. NAB 
booked the present value of HomeSide‘s mortgage servicing rights on its 
balance sheet, and plaintiffs claimed that a faulty valuation model was 
used. When the true value of the rights was revealed, NAB was forced to 
take a series of writedowns. As a result, its ordinary shares, which traded 
on foreign exchanges, tanked. In addressing whether subject matter 
jurisdiction existed under the effects test, the court found that ―the alleged 
fraud had very little—if any—demonstrable effect on the U.S. market.‖11 
As such, jurisdiction did not exist under the effects test. Applying the 
conduct test, the court determined that ―the allegedly fraudulent statements 
were ‗fired‘ from Australia at predominantly foreign plaintiffs who 
purchased NAB stock on that country‘s stock exchange.‖12 Because, ―[o]n 
 
 
 7. Parks v. Fairfax Fin. Holding Ltd., No. 06 CV 2820(GBD), 2010 WL 1372537, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (emphasis removed). 
 8. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis removed). 
 9. See, e.g., Tabor, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (―[N]o precise test has emerged from the various 
decisions in this Circuit . . . .‖) (listing six factors commonly considered by the courts when applying 
the conduct test); IIT, an Int‘l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (―It should be 
evident by now that the presence or absence of any single factor which was considered significant in 
other cases dealing with the question of federal jurisdiction in transnational securities cases is not 
necessarily dispositive in future cases.‖). 
 10. In re Nat‘l Australia Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 25, 2006).  
 11. Id. at *4.  
 12. Id. at *6.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
480 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:477 
 
 
 
 
balance, it is the foreign acts—not any domestic ones—that directly 
caused the alleged harm,‖ the court held that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiffs‘ claims.13  
On appeal, NAB and several amici curiae argued that the conduct and 
effects tests should be eschewed.
14
 Moreover, they contended ―that the 
general ‗presumption‘ against the extraterritorial application of American 
laws bars American courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 
these types of claims‖15 and that opening American courts to such actions 
would infringe upon the laws of other countries.
16
 The court disagreed: 
―[T]he potential conflict between our anti-fraud laws and those of foreign 
nations does not require the jettisoning of our conduct and effects tests for 
‗foreign-cubed‘ securities fraud actions and their replacement with the 
bright-line ban advocated by Appellees.‖17 The court also noted that 
―declining jurisdiction over all ‗foreign cubed‘ securities fraud actions 
would conflict with the goal of preventing the export of fraud from 
America.‖18 In addressing the jurisdictional issues in the case, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the Southern District‘s decision:  
This particular mix of factors—the fact that the fraudulent 
statements at issue emanated from NAB‘s corporate headquarters in 
Australia, the complete lack of any effect on America or Americans, 
and the lengthy chain of causation between HomeSide‘s actions and 
the statements that reached investors—add up to a determination 
that we lack subject matter jurisdiction.
19
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide ―whether § 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to 
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct 
in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.‖20 Before 
diving into its analysis, the Court addressed a threshold error in the lower 
courts‘ analyses and clarified that whether a § 10(b) cause of action exists 
is a merits—not jurisdictional—question.21 Moving on to consider the 
application of § 10(b) on the merits, the court opined that ―[i]t is a 
 
 
 13. Id. at *8. 
 14. Morrison v. Nat‘l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 174–75.  
 17. Id. at 175.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 177.  
 20. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.  
 21. Id. at 2877. 
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longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.‖22 In contravention of this well-
established canon of statutory construction, ―the Second Circuit believed 
that, because the Exchange Act is silent as to the extraterritorial 
application of § 10(b), it was left to the court to ‗discern‘ whether 
Congress would have wanted the statute to apply.‖23 This erroneous 
inference led to the development of the ―complex‖ and ―unpredictable‖ 
conduct and effects tests.
24
 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court 
concluded, on the basis of the canonical presumption against 
extraterritoriality, that the statute did not apply outside the U.S. because it 
lacked any affirmative indication from Congress that it should.
25
 
Moreover, the Court determined the statute‘s application is not impacted 
by the presence of domestic fraudulent conduct: ―For it is a rare case of 
prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the 
territory of the United States. But the presumption against extraterritorial 
application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel 
whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.‖26 Finding that 
―the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception 
originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States,‖ and that ―it is parties or prospective parties to those transactions 
that the statute seeks to protect,‖ the Court held that § 10(b) applies only to 
―transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges[] and domestic 
transactions in other securities.‖27 Because this case did not involve 
securities listed on a domestic exchange and the purchases occurred 
outside the U.S., the Court affirmed the dismissal of the action.
28
  
III. APPLICATION OF MORRISON: DOES § 10(B) REACH ISSUERS OF ADRS?  
Before Morrison, courts routinely held that § 10(b) applied in: (1) 
foreign-cubed actions if part of the fraud was carried out in the U.S. or had 
an impact on U.S. investors, (2) cases involving a U.S. citizen‘s purchase 
of a foreign issuer‘s ordinary shares outside the U.S., and (3) actions 
concerning the purchase of a foreign issuer‘s ADRs. For example, in 
 
 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 2878.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 2883.  
 26. Id. at 2884.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 2888. 
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Wagner v. Barrick Gold, the Southern District of New York held that a 
Canadian corporation‘s activities in the U.S. were sufficient to warrant 
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over Canadians who purchased 
ordinary shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
29
 In Bersch v. Drexel 
Firestone, a Canadian company made a series of public offerings of its 
common stock outside of the U.S., with some of the shares ending up in 
the hands of U.S. investors.
30
 The Second Circuit granted subject matter 
jurisdiction to American purchasers resident in the U.S. and even allowed 
claims to proceed on behalf of American purchasers resident abroad. In 
Billhofer v. Flamel Technologies, the Southern District of New York 
denied a foreign corporation‘s motion to dismiss a securities fraud claim 
brought by a class of ADR purchasers.
31
 By rejecting the conduct and 
effects tests, however, the bright-line rule articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Morrison drastically shortened the reach of § 10(b)‘s application. 
It is now unequivocal that, pursuant to Morrison, § 10(b) no longer 
applies in foreign-cubed actions.
32
 While cases involving U.S. purchasers 
of foreign securities outside the U.S. are more challenging, the recent case 
law also indicates that ―Morrison foreclose[s] the application of § 10(b) to 
any claims related to foreign securities trades executed on foreign 
exchanges even if purchased by American investors.‖33 In Plumbers’ 
Union, for example, plaintiffs purchased Swiss Re ordinary shares on a 
foreign exchange.
34
 The Southern District of New York found plaintiffs‘ 
argument that ―Plumbers‘ purchase is a domestic one because (a) 
Plumbers is a U.S. resident; (b) Plumbers made the decision to invest in 
the U.S.; (c) Plumbers suffered harm in the U.S.; (d) Plumbers‘ orders for 
Swiss Re stock were placed from Chicago; and (e) the traders who 
executed the purchase orders for Swiss Re stock were located in Chicago‖ 
to be without merit.
35
 The court held that the transactions at issue were not 
covered by § 10(b) and dismissed the action because the ―purchaser‘s 
 
 
 29. Wagner v. Barrick Gold Corp., 251 F.R.D. 112, 120–121 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 30. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).   
 31. Billhofer v. Flamel Techs., SA, 663 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 32. See, e.g., In re Celestica Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07 CV 312(GBD), 2010 WL 4159587, at *1 n.1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010) (dismissing ―claims of purported class members who acquired Celestica 
common stock on foreign markets‖); Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 
441, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (―The parties do not dispute that the FLNs [fund-linked notes] that Plaintiffs 
purchased were listed on European stock exchanges and the TRS [total return swap] was sold in 
Europe. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants‘ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs‘ federal securities 
fraud claims under § 10(b) . . . .‖).  
 33. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 34. Plumbers‘ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 
172 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 35. Id. at 178–79. 
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citizenship or residency does not affect where a transaction occurs,‖ ―the 
location of the harm to a plaintiff is independent of the location of the 
securities transaction that produced the harm,‖ and ―[t]he place from 
which Plumbers‘ traders placed Plumbers‘ orders or executed the trades 
. . . does not affect the location of Plumbers‘ purchase.‖36  
Morrison‘s impact is unsettled in the ADR context, however. An ADR 
represents an interest in a specified number of shares in the equity of a 
foreign company that are held by a depositary bank. A foreign company 
may establish a Level I, II, or III ADR program. In a Level I program, the 
ADRs, which trade in the over-the-counter market, have not been sold in 
the U.S. as part of a registered offering. Level II ADRs have not been sold 
pursuant to a registered offering, but are listed on a national securities 
exchange. The ADRs issued as part of a Level III facility are listed on a 
national exchange and issued pursuant to a registered offering.
37
  
While some courts have allowed the claims of ADR purchasers to 
proceed under § 10(b) (e.g., in Alstom the Southern District of New York 
dismissed the claims of plaintiffs who purchased ordinary shares on a 
foreign exchange but allowed the claims of ADR purchasers
38
), others 
have not. In Societe Generale, for example, the Southern District of New 
York found that trade in ADRs is a predominantly foreign securities 
transaction to which § 10(b) is inapplicable.
39
 Applying this reasoning, the 
court dismissed the claims of ADR purchasers sua sponte.
40
 The rule 
articulated by the court in Societe Generale is arguably grounded in tenets 
of fairness and economic reality. For example, because purchasing an 
ADR is functionally equivalent to trading an ordinary share on a foreign 
exchange, it could be argued that it simply would not be equitable to allow 
ADR purchasers to bring claims under the U.S. securities laws while 
simultaneously denying the claims of similarly situated investors that 
purchased the company‘s common stock.  
But the Supreme Court in Morrison laid down a hard and fast rule 
precisely to avoid the type of subjective analysis that was employed by the 
courts before Morrison and resulted in the ―unpredictable and inconsistent 
application of § 10(b).‖41 The value of the Morrison rule lies in its 
simplicity and clarity: ―[I]t is . . . only transactions in securities listed on 
 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. See SEC Release No. 274, 1991 WL 294145, at *3 n.21. 
 38. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 39. In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880. 
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domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to 
which §10(b) applies.‖42 In other words, ―[s]ection 10(b) reaches the use 
of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock 
exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United 
States.‖43 Although the trading in ADRs in Societe Generale was not on an 
exchange (it was over-the-counter),
44
 it did take place in the United States, 
and therefore, the court‘s holding is in direct conflict with the bright-line 
rule of Morrison.  
The application of the transactional test of Morrison in the ADR 
context is also supported by public policy concerns. Contrary to the 
arguments presented above, it would be even more unjust to allow foreign 
corporations to sell ADRs in the U.S. while simultaneously granting them 
immunity from investor civil suits under the anti-fraud provisions of the 
U.S. securities laws. Foreign corporations gain several benefits from 
setting up ADR programs, not the least of which is the ability to tap the 
expansive U.S. capital markets. Foreign corporations can benefit from 
U.S. investor demand for convenient diversification by raising capital here 
which they can then deploy to support their operations abroad. 
Alternatively, since capital raised from ADRs is denominated in U.S. 
dollars, selling ADRs provides an easy mechanism for foreign 
corporations to amass a war chest which they can use to expand operations 
or make investments in the U.S. It also increases a foreign company‘s 
visibility with U.S. institutional investors, which makes it easier to raise 
additional capital in the future, and increases liquidity for the company‘s 
shares. Demanding that ADR issuers be subject to the reach of § 10(b) if 
they decide to defraud their investors is a small price to pay for receiving 
these benefits. And, now that Morrison has drawn a clear line in the sand, 
a foreign corporation can easily conduct this cost-benefit analysis before 
deciding whether to issue ADRs.   
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Morrison has already had a 
profound impact on securities litigation. The new transactional rule lends 
clarity to an area of the law that was uncertain. Under Morrison, a foreign 
 
 
 42. Id. at 2884. 
 43. Id. at 2888.  
 44. The issue of whether trading in Level II and Level III ADRs is covered under Morrison is 
just as clear-cut since these securities are traded on a national exchange.  
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corporation should be insulated from the U.S. securities laws unless it 
chooses to sell its securities in the U.S. (e.g., by setting up an ADR 
program). Allowing corporations the choice ex ante of whether they want 
to subject themselves to the U.S. securities laws is not only good for them, 
it is also advantageous for investors because they now know with certainty 
whether their investments will be protected by the anti-fraud provisions of 
the U.S. securities laws. By preventing the U.S. from becoming ―the 
Shangri-La of class-action litigation,‖45 while staying true to the Exchange 
Act‘s intended purpose of protecting parties who transact in securities in 
the U.S., the bright-line rule of Morrison strikes a perfect balance; its 
application will continue to dramatically alter the securities litigation 
landscape.  
 
 
 45. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886. 
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